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ABSTRACT
A private investigation is an examination of facts, sequence of events, causes for deviance,
and responsibilities for negative incidents. Recent years have seen an increasing use of private
internal investigations in terms of the assessment of financial irregularities. The form of
inquiry aims to uncover vulnerabilities to unrestricted opportunities, failing internal controls,
abuse of position, and any financial misconduct such as corruption, fraud, embezzlement,
theft, manipulation, tax evasion and other forms of economic crime. When fraud examiners
discover evidence of white-collar crime, they almost always leave it to their clients to decide
whether or not to report crime to the police. We examine the gaps in white-collar crime
reporting after fraud examination and reasons behind such decisions. In Norway, these gaps
could be as high as 96% percent, as calculated in this article. Reasons for non-reporting
include concerns over law enforcement interference with business and consequences of law
enforcement, lack of trust in the police, and different perceptions of the seriousness of crime.
We apply the theoretical approach pioneered by Sykes and Matza (1957) and demonstrate
how techniques of neutralization apply to private fraud examiners’ reasoning for nonreporting of suspected or detected white-collar crime. We also offer some possible policybased solutions to reduce the identified gaps in reporting.
Keywords: financial crime, white-collar crime, crime reporting, private investigation, crime
disclosure.
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Reasons for Gaps in Crime Reporting: The Case of White-Collar
Criminals Investigated by Private Fraud Examiners in Norway
INTRODUCTION
Are Blomhoff was a priest and the managing director of the Betanien Foundation in Norway.
Two whistleblowers told their managers that Blomhoff had embezzled large amounts of
money. They did not directly inform the chairperson of the board, Christian Hysing-Dahl,
since it was not clear to the whistleblowers whether he was an ally of Blomhoff. When
Hysing-Dahl learned about the offense, he was reluctant to report the crime to the police
(Eikefjord 2015). Instead, he hired fraud examiners from auditing firm BDO (2014a) to
conduct two private internal investigations. However, when the whistleblowers threatened to
inform the media, even though they told the chairperson they wanted no police investigation,
Hysing-Dahl went to the police six months after he had learned about the crime. Drammen
district court later sentenced Blomhoff to 3 years in prison for embezzlement at the Betanien
Foundation (Drammen tingrett 2014).
The Blomhoff case is not at all the only example of reluctance to report white-collar
crime to the police. There seems to be quite a gap in crime reporting in the area of whitecollar crime occurring in organizational settings. This article explores the following two sets
of research questions:
1) How likely are private fraud examiners to report to the police the evidence of wrongdoing
they discover in their investigations? What does it tell us about the gaps in reporting?
2) What are the main reasons for private fraud examiners to avoid reporting the white-collar
criminals to the police?
First, this article explores gaps in crime reporting (Langton et al. 2012), with a specific
focus on property crimes (Harrell and Langton 2013; Tcherni et al. 2014). Next, we describe
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in more detail private fraud examinations (ACFE 2014; CFCS 2014; Gottschalk 2014), and
define and provide some context about white-collar criminals (Schoepfer et al. 2014;
Sutherland 1949). Then, we describe our theoretical approach that is rooted in the Sykes and
Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization and discuss how it applies to the potential lack of
reporting of white-collar crime. Finally, a sample of private investigation reports in Norway is
presented, and based on it, we attempt to answer the two sets of research questions posed
above. The potential reasons for secrecy and non-disclosure to the police are identified,
categorized, and discussed in the context of the neutralization techniques theoretical approach.
Some policy implications and potential solutions are offered to deal with the identified
problems.

Gaps in Crime Reporting
Tcherni et al. (2015) argue that there is a glaring gap in crime reporting in relation to the
growing category of property crime perpetrated online. When fraudulent transactions are
reported, it is often impossible to infer exactly how the information was obtained, or even
how it was exploited. Insurance company requirements that victims report losses to the police
may bias data in favor of higher value losses for those crimes where insurance payments are
involved (Skogan 1984; Tarling and Morris 2010).
Gaps in crime reporting concern the “dark figure of crime” problem, that is, factors
that cause reported statistics to diverge from and generally underrepresent the true nature and
extent of crime. The differences between measures of crime reported to (and by) the police
and actual crime are labelled gaps in crime reporting. For example, the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS) conducted annually in the United States on a large,
representative sample of general population allows us to make several observations about
gaps in crime reporting:
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1) The type of crime that is reported to the police most reliably is motor vehicle theft –
83% of it was reported to the police in 2006-2010 (Langton et al. 2012:4).
2) The largest gaps in reporting – i.e., the smallest proportion of victims reporting their
victimization to the police – exist for rape/sexual assault (35% was reported) and
household property theft (33% was reported), according to NCVS data for 2006-2010
(Langton et al. 2012:4).
3) The main reasons for not reporting property victimization (theft, burglary, larceny,
etc.) to the police are: “Police would not or could not help” (around 36% of those who
did not report), and “Not important enough to victim to report” (another 30% of nonreporters), as documented by Langton and her colleagues (2012:4).
4) If we focus on the identity theft portion of the National Crime Victimization Survey,
fewer than 10% of victims sampled by the NCVS in 2012 reported their victimization
to law enforcement agencies (Harrell and Langton 2013:24). Tcherni et al. (2015)
suggest that real gaps in reporting may be even wider, considering that not all victims
of identity theft realize they have been victimized.
Moreover, since a sizable portion of property crime is perpetrated online, there are additional
problems with underreporting of these crimes, besides the possible lack of awareness about
victimization: online property crimes are often perpetrated against organizations, and thus it is
very difficult to estimate their scope and reporting in the absence of concerted data collection
(Tcherni et al. 2015).
In this article, we examine in more detail a specific type of property crime – whitecollar crime – and discuss the reasons for its non-reporting. This type of property crime, just
like online property crime, is often perpetrated against organizations, and thus it cannot be
captured in victimization surveys of individuals. Unlike online property crime, white-collar
crime is typically disguised as part of conducting legal business operations by an employee or
4

business owner where the victim might be one’s own organization, another organization, or
governmental agency.
There are certain parallels and contrasts that can be drawn between white-collar,
online property crime, and street property crime, especially when comparing (non-)reporting
patterns, reasons for non-reporting, and theoretical considerations related to crime reporting.
We will explore in detail the main reasons why white-collar crime is not reported to the
police.
In fact, the decision about reporting often rests with the professionals who detect or
suspect white-collar crime first – private fraud examiners hired by companies in need of
audits – and thus it is important to clarify the role of these examiners.

Private Fraud Examiners
Internal private investigations examine facts, sequence of events, and the causes of negative
events as well as who are responsible for such events. Depending on what hiring parties ask
for, private investigators can either look generally for corrupt or otherwise criminal activities
within an agency or company, or look more specifically for those committing white-collar
crime. In other situations, it is the job of the private investigators to look into potential
opportunities for financial crime to occur, so that the agency or company can solve those
problems in order to avoid misconduct down the road (Gottschalk 2014).
Internal investigations include fact-finding, causality study, change proposals, and
suspect identification. Recent years have seen an increasing use of private internal
investigations in terms of the assessment of financial irregularities. The form of inquiry aims
to uncover unrestricted opportunities, failing internal controls, abuse of position, and any
financial misconduct such as corruption, fraud, embezzlement, theft, manipulation, tax
evasion, and other forms of economic crime (ACFE 2014; CFCS 2014).
5

Characteristics that can be attributed to a private investigation include a serious and
unusual event, an extraordinary examination to find out what happened or why it did not
happen, develop explanations, and suggest actions towards individuals and changes in
systems and practices. A private investigator is someone who is hired by individuals or
organizations to undertake investigatory law services. They often work for attorneys in civil
cases. A private investigator can also be called a private eye, private detective, inquiry agent,
fraud examiners, private examiners, financial crime specialist, or PI for short. A private
investigator does the dirty work to find the answers to who committed the crime. Financial
crime has become a major offense that private investigators are hired to find the solutions to
in order to bring justice to the individuals affected.
Criminal investigation is a goal-oriented procedure for reconstructing the past. It is a
method of creating an account of what has happened, how it happened, why it happened, and
who did what to make it happen or let it happen. Criminal investigation is a reconstruction of
past events and sequence of events by collecting information and evidence. An investigation
is designed to answer questions such as when, where, what, how, who, and why, as such
questions relate to negative events in the past. Investigations take many forms and have many
purposes. Carson (2013) argues that the core feature of every investigation involves what we
reliably know. The field of evidence is no other than the field of knowledge.
White-collar crime investigations are a specialized knowledge industry. Williams
(2005) refers to it as the forensic accounting and criminal investigation industry. It is a unique
industry, set apart from law enforcement, due to its ability to provide “direct and immediate
responsiveness to client objectives, needs and interests” (Williams 2005:194). Unlike police
“who are bound to one specific legal regime” (Williams 2005:194), the industry provides
flexibility and a customized plan of attack according to client needs.
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Private fraud examiners complete their work by providing clients with reports of
investigations. Examples in the United States include the Powers et al. (2002) report on the
Enron collapse, the Sidley (2010) report on corruption in procurement, the Valukas (2010)
report on the Lehman Brothers collapse, the Valukas (2014) report on the General Motors
ignition switch recalls, the Wilmer and PwC (2003) report on WorldCom accounting fraud,
and the WilmerHale and PwC (2008) report on Walters embezzlement.

White-Collar Criminals
A white-collar criminal is typically a member of the privileged socioeconomic classes in
society (Sutherland 1949) who is involved in illegal activities and commits nonviolent acts for
financial gain (Gottschalk 2012). The white-collar criminal is a person of respectability who
commits crime in a professional setting, where criminal activities are concealed and disguised
in organizational work (Pontell et al. 2014). The criminal has power and influence, he forms
relationships with other persons or professionals, which protects him from developing a
criminal identity, and he enjoys trust from others in privileged networks. White-collar crime
refers to offenses committed in an organization by those who indulge in dishonest activities,
either by themselves or using agents, for financial gain (Schoepfer et al. 2014).
One out of many explanations provided for white-collar crime is the fear of falling in
terms of a fear of losing what one has worked so hard to obtain (Piquero 2012). Given an
opportunity to commit white-collar crime, certain personality characteristics such as low selfcontrol increase the likelihood of committing an offense (Piquero et al. 2008).
Law enforcement targeted at white-collar criminals is non-aggressive and often
discrete not only because of the upper-class affiliation. Another reason is white-collar
defendants’ ability to recruit top defense lawyers who apply symbolic defense in addition to
substance defense, as well as information control, in their work for white-collar clients
7

(Gottschalk 2014). It is well known that having a well-qualified and possibly famous attorney
increases one’s chances of a favorable outcome in any legal dispute. Some individual whitecollar offenders avoid criminal prosecution because of the class bias of the courts (Tombs and
Whyte 2003). According to Pontell et al. (2014), some white-collar offenders may simply be
too powerful to go to jail.
When white-collar criminals appear before their sentencing judges, they can correctly
claim to be first-time offenders (Benson and Simpson 2015). According to Slyke and Bales
(2013), theory and empirical research often have agreed that white-collar offenders benefit
from leniency at the sentencing stage of criminal justice system processing. Croall (2007)
argues that the term “crime” is contentious, as many of the harmful activities of businesses or
occupational elites are not subject to criminal law and punishment but administrative or
regulatory law and penalties and sanctions. Therefore, very few white-collar criminals seem
to be put on trial, and even fewer higher-class criminals are sentenced to imprisonment.
Another reason for the low prosecution and conviction rate for white-collar criminals
is the extraordinarily broadly and fuzzily defined offenses in criminal law for white-collar
crime (Hasnas et al. 2010). In addition, it is often difficult to prove the intent (mens rea)
required for criminal conviction (Podgor 2007; Green 2014). Many (especially those in the
corporate world) view white-collar crime simply as risky business (Benson 1985; Will et al.
1998, Benson and Simpson 2015). Hence, there is a reluctance to charge top-level criminals,
as was evident in the aftermath of the 2008 economic meltdown in the United States (Pontell
and Geis 2013).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Criminals apply techniques in order to make them feel as though they have done nothing
wrong. These techniques are called neutralization techniques, whereby the feeling of guilt is
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neutralized. Neutralization theory, in its original formulation, was proposed by Sykes and
Matza (1957) to explain how juvenile delinquents’ desire to conform coexists with their
deviance. Sykes and Matza proposed five techniques of neutralization:
1. Denial of responsibility. The offender here claims that one or more of the conditions
of responsible agency were not met. The person committing a deviant act defines
himself or herself as lacking responsibility for his or her actions. In this technique, the
person rationalizes that the action in question is beyond his or her control. The
offender views themself as a billiard ball, helplessly propelled through different
situations.
2. Denial of injury. The offender seeks to minimize or deny the harm done. Denial of
injury involves justifying an action by minimizing the harm it causes. The misbehavior
is not really serious because no party suffers directly as a result of it.
3. Denial of victim. The offender acknowledges the injury, but claims that the victim is
unworthy of concern. Any blame for illegal actions is unjustified because the violated
party deserves whatever injury they receive.
4. Condemnation of the condemners. The offender tries to accuse his or her critics of
questionable motives for criticizing him. According to this technique, one neutralizes
his or her actions by blaming those who are the target of the action. For example, the
white-collar offender deflects moral condemnation onto those ridiculing corporations
by pointing out that they engage in similar disapproved behavior.
5. Appeal to higher loyalties. The offender denies the act was motivated by self-interest,
claiming that it was instead done out of obedience to some moral obligation. This
technique is employed by those who feel they are in a dilemma that must be resolved
at the cost of violating a law or policy. In the context of an organization, an employee
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may appeal to organizational values or hierarchies. For example, an employee could
argue that he or she has to violate a policy in order to get his or her work done.
Personal neutralization of misconduct and crime is not limited to white-collar criminals.
However, it seems that these techniques are applied by such criminals to a great extent
(Benson 1985; Piquero et al. 2005; Gottschalk and Smith 2011; Benson and Simpson 2015).
However, in this paper, we argue that the same techniques of neutralization also apply
to the reasoning of private fraud examiners when they make decisions as to whether they
should report the suspected crime to the police. Their desire to conform to the rules makes
them shift the responsibility for reporting possible illegal behavior to others – most likely, to
the client who ordered the investigation.

DATA AND METHODS
To find answers to our two research questions – How often are white-collar criminals
investigated by private fraud examiners not reported to the police and why – we applied an
approach of asking for private investigation reports. To ask for a report, we needed to know
that there was one. Our sources of detection of reports included media stories, rumors, and
personal contacts. During the year of 2014, we were able to access a total of 35 fraud
examination reports in Norway, as listed in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
Our sample was obtained through non-probability purposive sampling and thus cannot
confidently be said to represent all private investigations in a given country (Norway). At the
same time, the method of obtaining the reports included enough versatility in identifying the
private investigation cases where reports were written, and seeking out these reports. Thus,
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our sample can serve as a tentative way to get an approximate idea of the variety of whitecollar crimes being first detected or suspected by private examiners.
Norway is similar to other developed countries in Europe and North America in terms
of its business practices. Norway is a small country of five million inhabitants. In terms of its
size, climate, standard of living and demographics, Norway might best be compared to the
state of Connecticut in the United States. Therefore, this sample might be cautiously taken to
be representative of white-collar investigations in general in the Western world.
The second column in Table 1 lists the client organization where the fraud
examination was conducted, while the third column lists the firm conducting the
investigation. The fourth column describes white-collar crime suspicion that was to be
investigated by fraud examiners. Column five lists the number of pages in the internal
investigation report. Some of these reports are summary reports. For example, the ten-page
report from BDO (2014a) is a summary report, while the complete report has 150 pages. The
chairperson of the board, Christian Hysing-Dahl, was never willing to disclose the complete
report to us.
The two final columns in Table 1 are of particular interest to our research. Whether the
case was reported to the police is indicated with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Most cases were not reported
to the police, because investigators did not find sufficient evidence to claim that criminal
offense had occurred. 11 out of 35 cases were reported to the police (31%). If the case was
reported to the police, it might end up in conviction (Yes) or dismissal (No). In our sample, 7
out of 11 reported cases resulted in conviction, indicating that 64 percent of all cases reported
to the police ended up in prison sentences for white-collar criminals.
Table 1 lists all reports that we were able to detect and obtain as researchers in
Norway during the year 2014. A number of additional investigation reports were detected, but
they were not disclosed to us. We were denied access to reports at Din Baker bakery chain
11

investigated by PwC, Finance Credit money collection firm investigated by Ernst & Young,
Spitsbergen mining company investigated by PwC, Norwegian Parliament pension fund
investigated by a university professor, Nopec oil exploration company investigated by a law
firm, Veidekke construction company investigated by Ernst & Young, Yara fertilizer producer
investigated by law firm Wiersholm, ISS cleaning services investigated by PwC, and several
others investigated by fraud examiners. Some client companies did not respond to our
requests at all. Others provided reasons for denying the reports. Approximately 20 detected
private investigation reports were not disclosed to us.
We can assume that these 20 reports were neither disclosed to us nor to the police.
More importantly, the number of investigation reports never detected by us is much larger.
We can assume that about 100 knowledge workers in law firms, auditing firms and other
professional service firms in Norway work full-time on private internal investigations. If three
investigations are completed per person per year, then there are an estimated 300 reports
produced each year. When comparing our detected 55 reports to the estimated total of 300
reports, we get a fraction of only 18 percent that become known to us, and 12 percent (35
reports) ending up in the public domain.
We have no reason to assume that the suspected crimes investigated in the reports
disclosed to us are any more serious than the possible crimes investigated in the reports kept
from us. It is often the case that, as in the opening example to this article, crime only gets
reported to the police if whistleblowers come forward threatening to make their information
public. Their personal courage is likely a better indicator of reporting to the police than the
severity of misdeeds the whistleblowers want to disclose.
Investigators argue that reports are the property of their clients, while clients argue that
there are circumstances that prevent them from disclosing reports. In our search for private
investigation reports, we met a variety of reasons why we were denied access to investigation
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reports. The reasons for secrecy fall into three main categories. First, there were reasons
important to the company being investigated. Second, there were reasons important to the
investigating firm. Finally, there were reasons important for the relationship between the
investigated and the investigator. These reasons for the denial of report disclosure are listed in
Table 2.
[Table 2 about here]

RESEARCH RESULTS
In our sample of 35 detected and accessed fraud examination reports, 11 cases (31%) were
reported to the police. However, this figure cannot be taken to represent the true gaps in crime
reporting since the main reason we have these 11 cases in our sample is because they were
reported to the police. We have estimated that about 300 private investigation reports are
produced annually by fraud examiners in Norway. This number can serve as a conservative
estimate of white-collar crime cases since an unknown but probably a non-trivial number of
white-collar crimes like corporate fraud is not detected (Dyck et al. 2013; Zakolyukina 2014).
Thus, even assuming that some of these 300 reports are based on unfounded
suspicions, it is more likely that they still considerably underrepresent white-collar crimes
actually committed. However, let’s go with this lower, conservative estimate of just 300 cases
of suspected corporate fraud. If only 11 of them were reported, it means that 3.7% of all
detected corporate crimes were reported to the police.
We can take an alternative approach to estimating a true amount of corporate fraud.
Based on a clever use of a natural experiment (the fall of Arthur Andersen audit firm),
Alexander Dyck and his colleagues (2013) were able to estimate the incidence of corporate
fraud by comparing the rate of fraud detection by the new auditor compared to that detected
by Arthur Andersen, and they concluded that corporate fraud is likely to be committed by
13

14.5% of businesses. There are about 416,000 businesses in Norway, according to the
Norwegian Register of Business Enterprises (Brønnøysund Register Centre (BRC) N.d.). The
Dyck et al.’s (2013) incidence estimate would imply that over 60,320 of businesses in
Norway are likely to engage in some type of fraudulent business activities. 300 seems like an
impossibly low figure compared to the 60,320 estimate. If we go with this upper estimate of
60,320 possible fraud, only about .5% of these (300) are investigated by private fraud
examiners, and, as we stated above, less than 4% of these suspected crimes investigated by
fraud examiners are reported to the police. Clearly, our calculations support the initial
assumption in our paper that the gap in crime reporting for white-collar criminals is
substantial – over 96%.
Further, as we see from Table 1, 7 of the 11 reported cases (or 64% of cases reported
to the police), ended in convictions of white-collar criminals in court. These are the only cases
of corporate fraud brought to conviction in Norway. Thus, only about 2% of white-collar
criminals identified/suspected annually in private investigations (7 out of the assumed 300)
are brought to justice. And if we accept the possibility that over 60,320 businesses are
involved in some sort of corporate fraud, 7 cases represent the rate of criminal prosecution
and punishment of about .01%, or 1/100th of 1% of possible criminal activity.

To find answers to our second research question – Why are white-collar criminals
investigated by private fraud examiners not reported to the police? – we base our findings on
the analysis of our experience from detecting and asking for investigation reports in 2014.
Before we describe the main categories of reasons that private examiners do not report
the detected or suspected white-collar crime to the police, we have to point out the key factor
that determines the way private examiners see their responsibilities and options available to
them. This key factor has to do with control. By hiring examiners from an auditing firm or
14

law firm, the client organization pays for the investigation and is owner of the investigation
report. Thus, the client has complete control over information flows to and from the
investigation. As a result, the reasoning of private fraud examiners and the companies they
investigate lines up for the next three groups of reasons for non-reporting.

First, there is a group of reasons concerned with business and enterprise management and
maintaining control over the situation, where the company would like to avoid interference
with business:
1. Reputation. If it becomes known that the police are investigating the case, it could lead
to negative publicity and financial loss, in line with disclosure as described above. For
example, law-abiding employees who are attractive on the labor market could choose
to leave. Qualified external candidates could choose not to apply.
2. Exclusion. As long as the company is under investigation by the police, the company
may be put on hold for contracts in both the public and private sectors. Customers will
generally be more reserved towards the company. The same can happen with suppliers
because they are uncertain about the outcome of a police investigation.
3. Effort. Crime is not reported because it takes too much time and effort. The police will
ask for all kinds of documentation and access to computers. If the police opens an
investigation, then key employees will have to spend time in police interviews, and
executives will have to spend time explaining to police officers how the organization
operates. Instead of spending time with and for the police, the business prefers to
spend time with customers and developing new products.
Next, there is a group of reasons concerned with consequences of law enforcement (LE):
4. LE Penalty. Reaction against the company may be a reason for not going to the police.
The company hopes it can keep the matter hidden and thus not losing money as they
15

would have to pay a potential fine. Generally, the consequences of going to the police
are considered greater than keeping the matter hidden.
5. Protection from LE. Shielding both individuals and the organization from police
investigation is yet another reason for not disclosing evidence of white-collar crime to
the police. In a police investigation, people other than those who were subject to
negative attention might emerge in a bad light and possibly end up being indicted,
prosecuted, and convicted.
6. Bargaining with LE. Plea bargaining is available to a varying degree in different
countries. Where this option is limited or nonexistent, people will be even less
reluctant to report suspicions of white-collar crime to the police fearing the severe
consequences of prosecution. (A plea bargain is an agreement in a criminal case
between the prosecutor and the defendant whereby the defendant agrees to plead
guilty to a particular charge in return for some concession from the prosecutor, usually
a reduction in charges and/or more leniency in sentencing.)
Third, there is a group of reasons concerned with lack of trust in the police:
7. Police Passivity. Police often demonstrate passivity when approached about possible
offenses. Many cases are dismissed without investigation. A survey by Norway
Security Council (2014) shows that 75 % of companies that responded to the survey
agreed with the statement that crime is not reported because the police usually dismiss
the case without proper investigation. However, notice that in our current study, 64%
of cases referred to the police resulted in convictions. Thus, this reason might have
more to do with perception than reality.
8. Police Competence. Investigating white-collar crime suspicions requires highly
specialized expertise, which is often not available in the police at the time a potential
financial crime is reported to law enforcement. For years, forensic accountants from
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the private sector have been used by government agencies in crime investigations and
prosecutions.
9. Police Capacity. There is an inability of the state to unilaterally cope with the rising
tide of economic crime due to limited resources. Police officers with training in
financial crime investigations are hired by professional services firms where they can
double or triple their salary as financial crime specialists.
10. Police Failure. Just like a private investigation can fail to establish the facts, so can
police investigations fail to find the truth about a negative incident. If police
investigations are expected to end up in nothing, why bother involve the police, some
organizations may certainly argue. Again, this perception might not reflect the reality
correctly, since in about two thirds of the cases reported to the police in our sample,
the perpetrators were brought to justice. Alternatively, it can be that these were the
cases with the strongest evidence of wrongdoing and thus they do not represent the
other cases that were not brought to police attention.
Notice that, as we stated in the Gaps in Crime Reporting section above, the main reason for
individuals to not report their property victimization to law enforcement is very similar to the
above-described reasons: “Police would not or could not help”.

Finally, there is a reason for non-reporting that is concerned with a “grey-area” judgment of
whether the situation actually constitutes a crime. Moreover, this is one reason that is likely to
apply both to the client organizations being investigated and to the private investigators,
independently from their duties to their clients:
11. Trifle, or “grey area”. What happened is considered to be an insignificant issue.
White-collar offenders operate with relative impunity because of widespread
apathy in both private and public contexts. The organization has tolerance and
17

leniency towards internal criminals in trusted positions. For both insiders and
outsiders, it is not quite clear where the line can be drawn separating aggressive
or inventive business practices from illegal activities.

Applying Sykes and Matza’s techniques of neutralization, we can classify the first group of
reasons for the failure of private investigators and their clients to report their findings to law
enforcement (Reasons 1 through 3, related to interference with business) as falling into the
category of “denial of responsibility”: the client owns the report and thus they have the duty
to decide what to do with it, especially since it is their organization that will bear the brunt of
burden related to a possible police investigation. The responsibility of a business is to make a
profit in the market place. It is not the responsibility of a business enterprise to practice or
contribute to law enforcement in society. There is nothing in it for an organization to see a
former executive receive a conviction for white-collar crime in court and sentenced to prison.
The second group of reasons (Reasons 4 through 6, related to the consequences of law
enforcement) seems to reflect the “appeal to higher loyalties”: the loyalty of private fraud
examiners to the client is higher than their loyalty to enforcing laws. Similarly, the loyalty of
the client to organizational goals and strategies is higher than their loyalty to enforcing laws.
The third group of reasons (Reasons 7 through 10, related to distrust of police) is a
variation on Sykes and Matza’s “condemnation of the condemners”: police are likely
incompetent, overburdened and slow-to-react, and would not be able to do much so why even
bother turning to them. The police are not in a position to condemn business enterprises and
other organizations, as well as private investigators, for not disclosing crime reports to them,
as the police are often reluctant and incompetent to investigate. Private investigators thus
condemn the police as “condemners”.
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Finally, the last reason (Reason 11, concerning the lack of clarity on whether the
uncovered evidence points to an illegal activity), falls into the categories of “denial of
injury” or “denial of the victim”: private examiners may interpret the wrongdoing as just a
way of doing business that did not hurt anybody or that is done by other companies as well,
even if these other companies could have been the potential victims. In many cases, the client
organization is in itself the victim, and jailing offenders does not help recovering the loss.
Rather, a private and secret settlement with the offender can be more profitable to the former
employer.

DISCUSSION
Many fraud examiners consider their reports as the sole property of their clients, since clients
pay for the job and for the result in the shape of investigation reports. They consider their
work as a piece of consulting assignment or legal advice, which might be protected by the
client-attorney privilege (Schechtman 2014).
As a key issue in private investigations, disclosure is required to ensure criminal
justice is served by avoiding privatization of law enforcement or prosecution and conclusion
(for example, fired from the job and convicted to pay back of money). Therefore, all reasons
for secrecy are indeed questionable in cases of obvious crime suspicions. To avoid the
discomfort of concealing crime from law enforcement, the private fraud examiners are likely
using the techniques of neutralization: denial of responsibility (for the reasons for secrecy
including reputation, exclusion, and effort), appeal to higher loyalties (protecting the client
from LE penalty and damage), condemnation of the condemners (police passivity,
questionable competence and capacity, and perceived police failure), and denial of injury or
denial of the victim (when the situation is interpreted as trifle or “grey area” rather than
criminal activity).
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Several of these reasons fall into the same two main categories that are primarily listed
by property crime victims for not reporting the crime to the police: “Police would not or could
not help” (lack of trust in the police), and “[The situation is] not important enough to report”.
Another group of reasons – concern for consequences of law enforcement – closely resembles
a distant third reason nominated by individuals in the NCVS for non-reporting to the police:
“Fear of reprisal or getting offender in trouble”. And finally, what seems to be the key group
of reasons concerns business and enterprise management – interference with business – and is
uniquely connected with corporate considerations.
Secrecy to the police is a far greater question in society than cost-benefit for the
company involved. Private investigations are of concern because they involve a privatization
of police investigations of potential punishable acts.
While some private investigations come up with trivial findings as perceived by the
client, it happens that the business firmly believes there has been a crime and goes to the
police with their findings. But then the police may dismiss the case, which evokes very
negative reactions from the ones who reported the offense. Four such cases are listed in Table
1.
More frequently, however, the opposite seems to occur: the client does not think it is
serious enough to go to the police. When the police learn about the case, then it turns out to be
serious enough. Seven out of eleven (64%) cases led to prison sentences.
When the police in Norway learned about a communication company having bribed
officials in Romania to get a contract, it turned out that PricewaterhouseCoopers had already
investigated the matter and found misconduct. But top management at the communication
company Kongsberg Group had decided not to disclose the investigation report (Hovland
2014).
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Williams (2005) suggests the introduction of more rigorous protocols for the transfer
of cases between the public and private sectors, as well as the enactment of clearer guidelines
for working relationships between industry practitioners and the police.
We suggest that there are two ways to counteract the techniques of neutralization and
induce the private investigators to report the crimes they have potentially uncovered to the
police: “carrots” and “sticks”. “Carrots” could be some financial or other incentives to
provide for private investigators reporting the crime: for example, a portion of recovered
monetary value can be paid to the private investigator and his/her audit company (sort of a
finder’s fee). “Sticks” could be stiff financial penalties for not disclosing the suspected whitecollar crime to the law enforcement authorities. Alternatively, there can be legal mandates put
in place to require reporting of detected or suspected white-collar fraud, similar to the
mandatory corporate sustainability reporting instituted in many countries throughout the
world and turning out to be beneficial rather than damaging to business (see Ioannou and
Serafeim 2014).

CONCLUSION
The gaps in white-collar crime reporting after fraud examinations in Norway might be as high
as over 96 percent, as calculated in this article. Reasons for these gaps can be found in
avoidance of law enforcement interference with business, fear of consequences of law
enforcement, lack of trust in the police, and different perceptions of the seriousness of crime.
Based on Sykes and Matza’s theoretical approach, we argue that private fraud
examiners are likely to use the techniques of neutralization to support their decisions about
not reporting the crime to the police. They see their client – the organization where crime has
occurred – as the party responsible for the type of decisions related to notifying law
enforcement authorities.
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The rule of law and criminal justice is secured in constitutional states by public
prosecution and courts that are open to everyone to observe. If there are suspicions of
violations of criminal laws in a country, it is important that information about suspects
become known to public authorities such as police investigators and public prosecutors. Thus,
we offer some potential solutions to remedy the situation. Concerted legislative efforts can
create positive (“carrots”) or negative (“sticks”) incentives for private fraud examiners and
their audit companies to report suspected white-collar crime. Disclosure of investigation
reports is a must in cases of criminal offences. Preferably, investigation reports should not
only be disclosed to the police but also to citizens through the media and to researchers such
as ourselves.
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Table 1. Characteristics of reports from financial crime specialists in private investigations in
Norway
# Case

Investigator

Suspicion

Pages

Police

Prison

1 Adecco
Nursing and cleaning
services business

Wiersholm (2011)
law firm

Exploitation of work
force in nursing home in
terms of low wages and
inhuman working hours

22

No

-

2 Andebu kommune
Municipality

BDO (2014c)

Disqualification of
mayor in real estate
transactions

23

No

-

3 Ahus
Public hospital

PwC (2013a)
auditing firm

Buying expensive
geographical
information system
services

15

No

-

4 Betanien
Methodist Church
Foundation

BDO (2014a)
auditing firm

Embezzlement by chief
executive officer

10

Yes

Yes

5 Briskeby
Football stadium

Lynx (2011) law
firm

Over charging for
construction work at
football stadium

267

No

-

6 Eckbo
Family foundation

Dobrowen and
Klepp (2009) law
firm

Executives in ideal
foundation for personal
gain

119

No

-

7 Fadderbarna
NGO for children

BDO (2011)
auditing firm

Excessive
administration costs in
NGO

46

No

-

8 Forsvaret
Army

Dalseide (2006)
public
investigator

Suspected corruption at
procurement of
information technology

184

No

-

9 Furuheim
Church foundation

Dalane and Olsen
(2006) law firm

Executives in church
foundation for personal
gain

164

Yes

Yes

10 Gassnova
Carbon capture and
storage

BDO (2013a)
auditing firm

Irregular procurement
procedures by
employees

27

No

-

11 Hadeland og
Ringerike Bredbånd
Broadband
communication
company
Hadeland Energi
Utility company

PwC (2014a,
2014b)

Embezzlement by chief
financial officer

32
25

Yes

Yes

12 Halden ishall
Sports ice arena

KPMG (2012)
auditing firm

Excessive cost overrun
in reconstruction

121

No

-

13 Halden kommune
Municipality

Gjørv and Lund
(2013)

Manager in department
of planning and
construction suspected
of corruption

46

No

-

29

14 Kraft & Kultur
Power utility
company

Ernst & Young
(2012)

Chief executive officer
manipulated financial
results

31

Yes

Yes

15 Kragerø
Fjordbåtselskap
Shipping company

Deloitte (2012)

Chief executive
suspected of abuse of
company funds

109

No

-

16 Langemyhr
Construction
company

PwC (2008a)
auditing firm

Fraud by overbilling
city work in hours

26

Yes

No

17 Lindeberg
Nursing home

Kommunerevisjonen (2013)
auditing service

Outside authority of
personnel

92

No

-

18 Lundegruppen
Transportation
company

Bie (2012) law
firm

Fraud and tax evasion
for 30 million US
dollars

86

Yes

Yes

19 Moskvaskolen
Norwegian school in
Moscow

Ernst & Young
(2013a, 2013b)
auditing firm

Private living expenses
for dean covered by
school

52
23

Yes

No

20 Norges
Fotballforbund
Football association

Lynx (2013) law
firm

Football players
changing clubs without
clubs paying transfer
money

48

No

-

21 Norges Idrettsforbund BDO (2014b)
Sports Association

Chairperson suspected
of involvement in
corruption

4

No

-

22 Omsorgsbygg
City of Oslo nursing
home project in Spain

PwC (2009)
auditing firm

Abuse of public money
spent on friends in Spain
to build a local hospital
for Norwegians

92

No

-

23 Norsk Tipping
Public betting firm

Deloitte (2010)
auditing firm

Financial relationships
between employees and
external firm

61

No

-

24 Oslo Vei
Road construction
company

Kvale (2013) law
firm

Chairman and CEO
suspected of fraud after
bankruptcy

53

Yes

No

25 Romerike Vannverk
Public water supply

Distriktsrevisjonen (2007)

Chief executive
suspected of corruption
and embezzlement

555

Yes

Yes

26 Samferdselsetaten
Public transportation

PwC (2007)

Suspicion of kickbacks
from taxi owners for
licenses

88

No

-

27 Stangeskovene
Private forest
property

Roscher and Berg
(2013)

Board members
controlling share sales

94

No

-

28 Stavanger kommune
City of Stavanger
project for Turkish
children

PwC (2013b)
auditing firm

Smuggling of adopted
children out of Turkey
financed by the city of
Stavanger

14

Yes

No

30

29 Sykehuset Innlandet
Hospital

Davidsen and
Sandvik (2011)

Chief executive
suspected of
employment violations

15

No

-

30 Terra
Cities investing in
bonds

PwC (2008b)
auditing firm

Outside authority of city
management

52

No

-

31 Troms Kraft
Power supply
company

Nergaard (2013)
consulting firm

Accounting
manipulation in
subsidiary and illegal
political party support

663

No

-

32 Undervisningsbygg
School maintenance
agency

Kommunerevisjonen
(2006a, 2006b)
auditing service

Fraud by property
managers in the City of
Oslo

36

Yes

Yes

33 Verdibanken
Religious bank

Wiersholm (2012)
law firm

Investment fraud by
bank executive

5

No

-

34 Videoforhandlere
Video film
distributors and
dealers

BDO (2013b)
auditing firm

Subsidies paid to video
publishers

20

No

-

35 World Ventures
Lottery company

Lotteritilsynet
(2014) gaming
authority

Ponzi scheme in betting
firm

17

No

-
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Table 2. Reasons for denial of disclosure of private investigation reports to the public
Reasons important for the
investigated company

Reasons important for the
investigating firm

Reasons important for the
investigator-client relationship

Damage. The private
investigation report includes
business secrets that might be
damaging to disclose to
competitors.

Confidentiality. Lawyers and
other investigators require
respect of the client-attorney
privilege similar to medical
doctors and psychologists.

Suspicion. The investigation
report describes suspicion
towards individuals, which the
client neither chose to follow up
nor report to the police.

Disagreement. Executives in the
client organization disagree how
to interpret the investigation
report.

Error. Serious flaws, mistakes,
errors and shortcomings can be
found in the investigation
report, which investigators do
not want others to find out and
learn about.

Packaging. The investigation
report is impossible to read
because of lack of clarity in its
presentation.

Protection. Many key
individuals in the organization
have provided sensitive
information to the investigators.
They need protection.

Accusation. A number of
unfounded accusations against
individual persons can be
present in the investigation
report.

Termination. The internal
investigation was never
completed.

Workload. Before possible
disclosure, a number of words
need to be blacked out, which
represents too much work.

Failure. Investigators were
unable to answer the questions
formulated by the client in the
mandate, and the investigation
was thus a failure.

Evidence. Findings from a
private investigation can lose its
value as evidence in a following
police investigation and
prosecution in the criminal
justice system, if disclosed to
the public.

Discretion. Top executives who
initiated the investigation do not
like to see information about
themselves being disclosed.

Misconduct. Investigators
ignored or violated protection
against self-incrimination and
other ethical guidelines for
professional examinations.

Sensitivity. Both client and
investigator are afraid of
breaking privacy law because of
sensitive personal information
in the report.

Property. The client has paid
investigators for the report and
feels no obligation to disclose it
to others.

Criticism. Investigators do not
like the report to be exposed to
criticism by researchers and
others.
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